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A  
PROJECT  
OF A  
DESCENT  
UPON  
FRANCE.

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By a Person of Quality.

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L O N D O N.

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# PREFACE.

**T**HIS Paper was written last Winter: and should then have been published, had it not been for some Impediments. And the Business of Valona happening since, the mention of it is now added in the transcribing. I crave leave to say further, that the whole Form of this Project was communicated divers Months agoe, to some Persons proper. and if they were not pleased to make use or take notice of it, the Author is not to be blamed. The time seems not yet past, for pursuing the Design here recommended. But if it should be past, so that it were now too late to shew what may be done; yet it will be a Satisfaction to the curious, to know what might have been. Moreover there are some things here offer'd, that may perhaps

## P R E F A C E.

perhaps rouse up the Spirits of our English Nation, and put them likewise in Mind to do some Good for themselves. Of which there is now such an Opportunity, as is hardly to be again expected. But if it be decreed that We must get nothing, we must be content.

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A  
PROJECT  
OF A  
DESCENT  
INTO  
FRANCE.

**I** That erewhile have sounded a Trumpet for a Voyage Royal into *France*, must now aim at lower and lesser things, and content my self with a Descent: if even that may be obtain'd. Had we a Peace in *Ireland*, we might continue our Thoughts of a Voyage Royal. Our King might then be in the Head of a mighty Army, compos'd entirely of his own-Subjects: who would delight to follow him and serve him in so glorious an Expedition. He might have them to any number under a hundred Thousand. We might then act separately, and with Honour; and we might make a great Figure in the World. And moreover we might hereby

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give

give to our Confederates a most effectual Assistance; making their Work easie by so strong a Diversion. Such an Invasion as this, would in all Probability turn the Fortune of the Warr at once: Such a Voyage as this, would make us emulate the great Actions of our Ancestors in *France*: and we might reasonably hope for as good Success. For tho the *French* are much stronger now, than they were in those days; yet by reason of their many other Enemies, assailing them on all sides, we should find them much weaker.

These would be the Effects of a Peace in *Ireland*. But this Peace hath not been had: there have been too little Inclinations to it. Though all *Europe* ( I mean, all those that would pull down the *French* King) be as much concern'd to have it, as to have a Peace in *Hungary*. For there is the same Consequence and Advantage of both: and that is, That thereby we may be enabled to bring all our Forces against the *French*.

This being the Condition of Affairs, and the main of our Force being still detained in *Ireland*, so that only Part of it can act against *France*; it is to be consider'd, how this Part may be employed to most Advantage. Suppose then that of our seventy Thousand Men ( which is the present Establishment wanting a few Hundreds, and for which the Parliament hath provided full Pay) we should turn twenty Thousand against *France*. And I hope we may suppose likewise, that we shall have a Fleet out this Summer,  
that

that will make us Masters at Sea. Here I presume to affirm, that this twenty Thousand Men being put on board our Fleet, will do more Service, and be a greater Terror to the *French*, than any other way whatsoever.

But what must these Men do when they are on board the Fleet? What will be their Business? I answer; their Business will be, to run straight upon the *French* Coast, and there to Land: or in other Words, to make a vigorous Descent into *France*.

There are several things that recommend this Design to us.

First, The *French* cannot hinder us from Landing, tho they had no other Enemy, and though all their Forces were drawn down to the Sea-side, yet it could not be done. But when all their regular Troops are engaged elsewhere, it were a great Mistake, if *Arrier Bans* and Country Militias should so much as endeavour it. Sir *Walter Rawleigh* knew these Matters as well as any Man in the World. And his bare Opinion might seem sufficient in the Case. But he not only affirms, but also gives plain and clear Demonstration, that it is impossible to keep an Enemy from Landing, if he be Master at Sea. And the thing is confirmed by universal Experience. For never any Army that came against a Country by Sea, did fail to Land upon it.

Secondly, When we are Landed, nothing can hinder us from fortifying. If twenty Thousand Men, having the Sea and a Fleet behind them, cannot in-

trench, (either in a Town or upon the open Shoar) so as to defend themselves against any Force that can be brought against them; they deserve to be cut in pieces. But they must labour hard: and they must have good store of Spades, and Mattocks, and Baskets, and Barrows: and they should carry Palisadoes ready with them.

In the third Place, Nothing can hinder, but that the Place we thus fortifie may be some weak Port. There are many such on that side of *France* which lyes upon our *English* Channel: and which is, from *Calice* to *Brest*, near five Hundred Miles in Length. But in all this Coast between *Brest* and *Calice*, there are but three Ports of any Strength considerable; and those are *Havre de Grace*, *Honfleur* and *S. Matoes*. All the rest are in a manner open Towns, and may be easily seized by any strong hand that approaches them. As for *Graveling* and *Dunkirk*, they are in the *French* *Flanders*, and out of these Bounds.

Fourthly, Any Port that we thus fortifie, may be made as good as *Calice*: provided it be relievable by Sea, and not commanded by Land. And by the Labour of twenty Thousand Men, it may in two Months time be put in such a Condition; that a Garrison of eight or ten Thousand, being backed by the whole Power of *England*, will defend it against the whole Power of *France*. It is not necessary, that it should be a good Port: it cannot well be worse than *Calice*. and the *French* have no good Port upon these narrow Seas,

Seas, save only *Brest*, and *S. Malo's*, and *Dunkirk*. It will be sufficient, if the Place can receive and secure small Vessels. Also this Place should be upon these Seas, that it may be reinforced and supplied from *England* with every Snatch of Wind: lying also in the way of our grand Fleet.

Fifthly, This rampart Garrison, having a thousand or fifteen hundred Horse lodged in it, will command the Country far and wide. The *French* in *Mastricht*, with the like number of Horse, exacted so great a Contribution, that they sent at one time (over and above the maintenance of the Garrison) eight hundred Thousand Crowns in Money to their *Flanders* Army. *Dunkirk* had but five hundred Horse while the *English* held it: and they commanded Contribution forty Miles round. as I have been told by Sir *Tobias Bridges*, who had the Command of those Horse. Sixthly, I grant that the *French* will do their utmost to curb and bridle this Garrison. But it will be to little purpose. While the *Dutch* held *Ostend*, all the Power of *Spain* (which was then very great) could not hinder that Garrison from making Incursions into *Flanders*. But if the *French* should beset us with extraordinary Vigour, we must take them off by giving them more Work elsewhere: that is, by seizing and fortifying some other Ports. For my meaning is, that our moving Force be still kept up to the full number of twenty Thousand; to make farther Progresses, and to harass and torment the *French*. When these Fires are thus kindled in several

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ral Places, they will find it very hard to quench them. and tho possibly they might be able to oppose the Insults of one Garrison, yet they can never bear up against three or four, or perhaps a greater number. These Garrisons being scattered upon their whole Coast of five hundred Miles; and every one of them having behind it the whole Power of *England*, to support and enforce it. Admitting therefore, that the Power of *France* were double or treble to that of *England*, and that their whole Power were turned against us; yet having them at this Lock, we should be too hard for them.

Seventhly, There needs no mighty number of Transport Ships for this Service. For our Grand Fleet, which will be always in these Seas, will with great ease carry over the fore-mention'd twenty thousand Men. I mean the Foot; of which this Force will almost wholly consist. For the Horse must be carried in Vessels proper, which may also be done at leisure; they being not useful either in the Landing, or the Fortifying, which are the Things first to be done. It is not here intended, that our great Ships of War should run close in to the *French* Shore: for generally the Seas are there shallow and dangerous. But they may go as near as they can safely; and there lying off, they may send the Men ashore in their Boats and Tenders, or in other small Vessels. which for a Miles Passage, or two or three Miles, may be stuffed as full as they can hold.

Eighthly,

Eighthly, If we can fix Garrisons in this *French*  
 Coast, we may well presume they will be strongly  
 supported from *England*. The greatest part of our  
 standing Forces may without much inconvenience lie  
 in the Counties adjoyning to that Sea, and be ready to  
 embark upon all Occasions. And I may venture to  
 say, That even our Trained Bands (and particularly  
 those of the said adjoyning Counties) would march  
 with all chearfulness, to make good our Footing in  
*France*. the *London* Auxiliaries I dare engage will do it.  
 Nor can Ships be wanting to transport them. for be-  
 side the Ships that must be kept for that purpose, those  
 Seas are always full both of our Men of War and Mer-  
 chants. But since standing Armies must not always  
 be in *England*; and since the Militia's of some Coun-  
 ties must not be press'd with greater Duty than others,  
 unless in cases extraordinary; we must think of some  
 way beside, to support and enforce our *French* Garri-  
 sons. It is therefore proposed, that fifteen or twenty  
 thousand Foot, and three or four thousand Horse be  
 lifted and armed in the said adjoyning Counties; that  
 is, in the Counties to the South of *Thames*, with the  
 addition of *London* and *Middlesex*. These Troops to  
 be ready to march and embark upon every sudden  
 Command. Every Footman to have forty or fifty  
 Shillings a Year, and a Horseman eight or ten Pound,  
 and their Officers in proportion: with full Pay while  
 they are in Service. Such an Establishment will not  
 be of any great Charge. but what ever it be, *France*  
 will

will be made to pay it. For our Garrisons in *France*, being back'd by such a Body of Horse and Foot, will command much farther into the Country: each of them will command as far, as if this Body of Men were constantly lodged in it. And surely *England* will then be glorious, when we have a Range of Garrisons the whole length of the Channel, upon *French* Ground, and maintain'd by *French* Contributions. It will be such a Frontier, such a Barrier, as never any Kingdom hath had the like.

Ninethly, There are upon this *French* Coast, as before hath been noted, divers Ports and Creeks (such as they are) that are capable of being well fortified. but some of them are more inviting than the rest: of which I shall name a few. In *Picardy* there is *Bologne*, or (as we call it) *Buttes*: a place of great Fame amongst us *English* Men, since *Henry* the Eighth took it. But all its Fortifications are now demolisht, save only the old Walls of the upper Town. I confess this Place is not for our turn: because even the lower Town lies some distance from the Sea. But we may remember, that while we held it, the *French* begun a Fort (and they called it *Fort Chastillon*, from the Famous Admiral of that Name) between the Sea and the lower Town. If we should now make a large Intrenchment in this Place, (for little ones are good for nothing,) and should fill it with a Garrison of ten thousand Men, it would dismember all the *French* Conquests in *Flanders*: for it would command them quite thorough.

thorough. It would do the *French* five times more hurt, than the taking of *Mons* hath done them good. In vain would *Humieres* guard his Line, to hinder the Incurfions of the *Brabanders*, if fuch a Fire were kindled behind him. Then if we go on to *Normandy*, we fhall there find *Harflew* and *Quillebeuf* at the Mouth of the *Seine*. which Places, though they lie open at prefent, have been ftrong formerly. The former endured a Siege from our *Henry* the fifth when he conquer'd *Normandy*: being the Firft-fruits of that glorious Expedition. And the later, in the Civil Wars of *France*, was the only place for a time, that *Henry* the fourth had upon that River. during which time, it fhrewdly annoyed *Roan* and the other Places which the Leaguers held. If it be objected that *Havre de Grace* and *Honfleur* lie lower upon the fame River, and therefore ftop the Passage to the other two Places; I deny the Confequence: for the River is here fo wide, that there is no ftopping of the Passage. Moreover in the fame *Normandy* there is the Town of *Cherburg*, juft over-againft our *Spit-head*. It was always a Garrifon till this dangerous War broke out. At which time the *French* King refolved to keep no Garrifons, fave very ftrong ones. And he found that this Place could not be made very ftrong, unlefs fome high Grounds were taken in that command it. which new Line would require fo much Labour to make it, and fo many Men to defend it, that he chofe rather to flicht the whole, an old Caftle excepted; which Caftle is of no Strength to-

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wards the Land, against an Enemy that hath made a Descent. If we go further on to *Bretagne*, the Haven of *Conquest* doth there lie fair for us. I confess it is no deep Harbour, it lying dry at every low Water: But a great and strong Fortification in this place, with a great and strong Garrison in it, would be very useful to us, were the Harbour never so mean. Also this Place is so much the better, because it is so near the Port of *Brest*, and would be a means to bring us better acquainted with it.

Lastly, The attacking the Port of *Brest* it self, is a principal end and use of these Land Forces on Ship-board. Not to get it for our Selves, for that requires a much greater Force: but to spoil it to the *French*, which would destroy at once their Power at Sea, they having no other Harbour for great Ships upon all this Coast. Let us therefore consider how this Port lies. It opens to the Westward: being at the very Lands end of *France* (which is much broader than that of *England*;) just where the Bay of *Biscay* comes up to the Mouth of the *English* Channel. Without this Port there is a Commodious Bay, almost in form of a Semicircle, and about two Leagues over: the Seamen call it *Brest-Water*. The depth of it in most places is from ten to fifteen Fathom, and no where under seven. The entrance of the Port is about a League in length, and about half a League broad. And close under the Southern Shore of it there is a deep and narrow Channel; the rest being rocky, and shoat water. As for the

the Port it self, it is much greater within than the Bay is without; being deep for the most part, and running into the main Land by divers Creeks or Spurs. and upon a Northerly Creek of it the Town of *Brest* is situate: being exceeding strong, and very well mann'd and furnisht. Here now it is plain, that there is no attempting the Town, with the Force that can now be brought against it. Nor indeed would it do us any Service to have it, as long as the *French* command the Entrance of the Port, which we must presume they have strongly fortified. We must therefore apply our Thoughts to this Entrance of the Port, and to the Bay without. As for the Bay, (to speak of that first,) there is no doubt, but that if we had a great Fort on each side, and in them two or three hundred good reaching Guns, the *French* would find it very uneasie riding or lying in this Bay, and not very safe passing. I have been present, where Men of great Skill have had a large Draught of this Bay before them, and have pointed to the very places where these Forts should be. And surely if we are Masters at Sea, nothing can hinder us from making these Forts. Then for the Entrance of the Harbor, there are divers things that may be done there. One thing is, (and they that well know the place do think it very feaſable,) to choke the narrow Channel or Passage by sinking of Ships. which being loaden with Stone-work and Tarras, will not easily be removed. Another thing is, to make a good Fort on the Northern side of this Entrance:

where I think the *French* have no Fort, the deep Channel being on the other side. But if they have a Fort there, and it cannot speedily be taken, we must make another not too near it. which, though half a League from the deep Channel, would shrewdly annoy both single Ships, and much more grand Fleets, in their passage. A third thing is, to make a good Fort on the Southern side, just upon the deep Channel. where, though the *French* may have more than one already, yet they cannot have so many, but that another Fort may live by them; this Shore (as hath been said) being three Miles in length. 'Tis much if we cannot find a place without their outermost Fort, which though it be not so very near the deep Channel, may yet command it sufficiently. But if there be no such place without, we must fix upon one within. and our Forces being landed from the Bay, may by Land come down to it. You will say that such a place cannot be relieved and supplied by Sea, the *French* having a Fort without it. But I answer, That this cannot hinder small Vessels from coming to it by Night, and at high Water. for even the shallow parts of the Entrance will be then deep to such Vessels. There is yet another thing to be done at this Entrance into the Port of *Brest*: and that is, That since by the deepness of the Channel, our great Ships may come close to the Forts lying upon it; they may (with their mighty force of Cannon) beat these Forts about the *Frenchmens* Ears. which will be the easier done, if they are  
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attacqued by Land at the same time. They that are acquainted with these Matters, know that a Fort in such cases is a meer idle Bugbeare: and that any Fort, approachable by great Ships, may be thus beaten to pieces. unless it be large, and have a mighty number of Guns. for then it may be too hard for the Ships at their own Weapon. I confess this thing requires great skill and courage: nor is it to be done by every Fool. but I know the Men, that can and dare do it.

**I** must now answer some Objections against this Project of a Descent.

It may be objected, that having proposed twenty thousand Men to be employed against *France*, I do afterwards design further to have several great Garrisons: which may take up above forty thousand Men more. so that I have out-run my own Proposal. To this I answer, That 'tis true, here will be required an increase of Men; which we may safely presume we cannot want, if they are well paid, and have good *English* Officers. but here will be no increase of Charge, which is the main thing to be feared. For these Garrisons will maintain themselves. and by how much greater they are, by so much better they will do it.

It may also be objected, that the way here proposed, is a very laborious and chargeable way of Conquering. it would probably cost us less to take Towns ready fortified and furnished, than to raise these Fortifications from the Ground. But I answer, That we must not think

think of taking strong Towns, unless we had an Army that would make us clearly Masters of the Field. Such an Army, I confess, might find every thing easy. but such an Army we cannot have in *France*, unless we had a Peace in *Ireland*. which Peace it concern'd us to have upon any Terms, that so we might apply all our Force to pull down this *French* King. for except we do it, we are in great danger to be destroyed by him. Since therefore, by reason of the *Irish* War continuing, we cannot do as we would, we must do as we may. Moreover the Method here proposed, though it may seem slow and heavy, yet it is sure, and void of all hazard; there being hardly a possibility of miscarriage. and it would put the *French*, whom we must allow to be shrewd Gamesters, quite beside their Play. And what would the Charge of these Fortifications be? It would chiefly consist in the Labour of Men; and here are twenty thousand ready to perform it. And a small matter given to those that labour, over and above their ordinary Pay, would make them labour chearfully. which was the way of the old Princes of *Orange*. Suppose then, that one time with another, there be twelve thousand Men at Work: at a Groat a day extraordinary. this comes in the whole to two hundred pound a day: which for every hundred days is twenty thousand pound, and seventy three thousand for the whole year. which is no such affrighting Sum.

It may be objected likewise, that having fortified these Places as it hath been here projected, we shall lose them

them when we have done. And the fresh Example of *Valona*, and of *Calice* of old, and afterwards of *Ostend*, *Candia* and *Dunkirk*, seem to strengthen this Apprehension. But all this notwithstanding, it will be very hard and very strange, if the whole Power of *England* should not be able to defend a great and strong Intrenchment, against any Power whatsoever. that is, If the place be near us, and lie open to Sea, of which Sea we are Masters. for such a place hath the whole Power of *England* to support it. What do you talk of *Valona*? If we cannot do better than the *Venetians*, we deserve to have our Legs cut off. These are they, that when their Enemy could make no resistance considerable, being so terribly over-laid elsewhere; have been trifling away their time, for divers years, in making a Conquest that is not worth one Farthing. for it will never bear the charge of maintaining it. But had the gallant *Cornaro* who took *Valona* been alive, (the only Man of the *Venetians* that deserves that Name;) he would not have lost it in that manner, while a Fleet with Land Forces on board it lay in the Harbour. He would have put himself into the Town, taking both his Landmen and Seamen with him; and have made good the Breach (for it seems a Breach was made) by repairing, and retrenching, and strength of Men. As for *Calice*, it was lost by the Sottishness of Queen *Maries* Council; and their shameful neglect to send it Supplies, notwithstanding the repeated Instances of the Lord *Wentworth* then Governour. *Ostend*  
was

was too little, and was lost for want of ground. however it held out a violent Siege of three years and upwards. But *Candia* is an encouragement to this fortifying Project. for if we can raise Fortifications in two or three months, that can stand a Siege of above twenty years, as *Candia* did; we need not repent the Bargain. I could wish that *Dunkirk* might be past over in silence: for the selling of it, especially to the *French*, is a shame to our Nation. I do well remember a Discourse, not long after the thing was done, between a Knight and an Squire upon this Subject. The Knight was the before-mention'd Sir *Tobias Bridges*, who commanded the Horse there: the Squire shall be nameless: But he desired to know of the Knight, what were the true Reasons of our parting with *Dunkirk*. and the Knight ask'd him again, what He (the Squire) thought to be the true Reasons of it. I had rather (said the Squire) learn from You, who know better. But I (said the Knight) desire to hear Your Reasons. Then said the Squire, I have heard several Reasons alledged. One is, That the keeping it would be a continual Charge to us. Not so, says the Knight, for the Parliament that establisht the Kings Revenue, had the Article of *Dunkirk* laid before them among the other Expences of the Crown; and they allowed it, and provided fully for it. so that it could not be accounted a Charge to the King. but however it would be a Charge to the Kingdom, said the Squire. If the Kingdom, said the Knight, were willing to bear it, as they were

were most willing; where was the harm? And how could they bestow Money better, then towards the keeping of a brave Nursery of Soldiers, in a Post of mighty importance and advantage both to Sea and Land, and in exact and compleat Military Discipline? But moreover the Charge, when the Works were finisht, would have been inconsiderable. For we commanded such a Contribution in the Countries, forty Miles every way, as would maintain the Garrison: at least within a small matter. And therefore, the Knight added, what you have said about the Charge, is no Reason. Then the Squire proceeding; Another Reason, saith he, is this: That the Place is not relievable by Sea, it lying some distance from it. I confess, said the Knight, that it lies near half a Mile from the Sea. But the Ground between the Sea and the Town is so low and so wet, that no Enemy can work through it to block up the Passage. And therefore this is no Reason neither: have you any more Reasons? Yes, says the Squire, I have one Reason more; They say the Place was not strong, nor could it ever be made strong. Here the Knight granted, that the Town was not compleatly strong while We *English* held it. But, said he, whoever had seen the New Works, begun and a good deal advanced by My Lord *Triuitt*, must have allowed that it might be made very strong. What could you do with the Sand-hills, said the Squire, which when a strong Wind came that way, did use to blow into the Town Ditches, and to fill them quite up? We took a course with those Hills, answer'd the Knight: for we carried them clear away, and threw them into

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wet Ditches and Marshes, whence they will never rise  
 more. And to speak at once, the Place is now in fact  
 one of the strongest of *Europe*. Then said the Squire, I  
 have given you my Reasons, and I can think of no more  
 at present: pray let me now hear Your Reasons, I shall  
 give but one Reason, said the Knight: which I think  
 the true one. The *French* had then an Army on foot,  
 and not far from us. And if this Army had marched  
 straight to *Dunkirk*, and had attacqued it in the Condi-  
 tion it was in, and before the New Works were finish'd,  
 in all probability they had carried it. It seem'd therefore  
 advisable rather to sell it for Money, then to have it taken  
 from us by Force. But what if the Garrison had been  
 doubled, said the Squire, till these New Works could  
 have been finish'd? Nay that, said the Knight, would  
 have made it hot work. Why then I will undertake, said  
 the Squire, that to relieve *Dunkirk*, the Auxiliaries of *London*  
 would have marched at two days warning, and all other  
 parts of *England* accordingly. And therefore the Reason  
 you have given, proves also no Reason. You must take it  
 as it is, said the Knight; for I can give no better. And  
 so this Discourse ended. Which I have inserted here, to  
 give some light into that ugly Business of *Dunkirk*. She  
 that lost *Calice* did use to lay; that when she was dead,  
 they should find *Calice* at her Heart. But He that sold  
*Dunkirk*, deserv'd to have it written upon his Forehead.  
 it is surely a Brand upon his Memory. Had the Interest  
 or Honour of our Nation been minded, or any thing  
 but Baseness and Vice, and the *French* Greatness; We  
 might have kept *Dunkirk* to this day. And there is no-  
 thing

thing, either in that or in the other Instances, that should discourage us from embracing the Project here offer'd. But enough of this: let us now proceed in the Objections.

It may be objected further, that here is a Design for employing twenty Thousand Men; and nothing hath been said, where or how we shall have them. To this I answer; that if nothing hath been said hitherto, it is now time to say something. But it hath been already intimated, that all the Forces we can spare from the *Irish War*, and turn against *France*, which were supposed about twenty Thousand, might be put into our *Fleet*. But you will say, they are already in *Flanders*: I answer, they are then so much out of their way. but they may be easily taken on board, (I mean chiefly the Foot) from *Ostend* and *Newport*. You will say further, that they cannot be spared from those Parts: and I answer further, that they may well be spared, if they draw after them twice as many *French*: which they will certainly do. For the *French* must defend their maritime Provinces, and Country Militias cannot do it: so that of necessity they must draw back great Numbers of their regular Troops. who even these also will be too little, if the Methods be followed that have been here proposed. But (were it not for the *Irish War*, we might leave our Forces in *Flanders*, and fill our Fleet with those now in *Ireland*. And therefore some that wish well to *England*, and to their Majesties happy Government; wish the *Irish* Lands we fight for, were all in the bottom of the great Ocean. in regard they take us off from our Main Business, which is the hewing down of the *French King*. While we

are rooting out the *Irish*, and in pur suit of their Lands, God only knows to what Distresses we may be brought. The Losses we have received already, and the Difficulties and Hazards that may befall us hereafter, must all be imputed to these *Irish* Lands. Could we have turn'd our whole Force against the *French*, these things had not been: it had, in all likelihood, given a new face to the War upon the Continent. But you will say; as the War of *Ireland* continues, so that Men cannot be had from thence for the Project here offer'd: So out of *Flanders* they cannot be had, because we are obliged to have them there, (that is, eight or ten Thousand of them to assist the *Dutch*, by virtue of a Treaty with King *Charles*. To this I answer, that it is much doubted, whether this Treaty do thus oblige us. It obliges both Parties to assist each other with that Number, in case either be attacked. But if both be attacked, the Obligation seems to cease, and we must take new Measures: both being concern'd to do their utmost against eth Common Enemy. Moreover the *Dutch* might be more effectually assisted, by our having these Men in *Normandy* or *Brétagne*, then by our having them in *Flanders*. So likewise if the Duke of *Savoy* have twenty Thousand Pounds a Month, it might do him more Service to have this Mony (which would maintain 10000 Men more) employed upon the Project here offer'd, than to have it remitted in specie: For the good Effects of a Descent upon *Normandy* or *Bretagne*, would be felt in *Piémont*. Thus we have found Money as well as Men, towards the carrying on our Project. There is a further means to get Men, which is this. I have said before, that if a good Part

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of our standing Forces were drawn down to the Sea-side towards *France*, they might there ly ready to embark, for relieving and reinforcing our *French* Garrisons. And they may in like manner be employed in our first Descents or Invasions. Nor would they be taken off thereby from their *Business*, that is, their Guard of *England*. For that Sea being narrow, and our Fleet commanding it; they would in effect have one Foot in *England*, while the other is in *France*. But there is an Expedient yet remaining, both for Men and Money, which will be sure to do the Work: and which we must make use of, if the rest should fail. and that is, that we now raise this twenty Thousand Men, and likewise raise Money to maintain them. And this is the thing I have now to say in this matter, if nothing had been said before.

I hope I have fully satisfied all the Objections. But this last Expedient may perhaps be a little startling. What? More Money at this time of day? Yes, more Money, when all lies at Stake; and to preserve us from utter Destruction. there being (I fear) no means to prevent it, but by a Descent upon *France*; which must be carried on with this Money. We must therefore resolve, in this great Exigence, to strain our selves to the utmost. We must do any thing, rather than be Slaves to the *French*.

But, whereas I have spoken of raising Men and Money, these Matters deserve to be further consider'd. As for the Men, we may rely upon it, that they will come in most readily and cheerfully for a Descent upon *France*. Provided there be two things observed, which I have slightly

slightly mentioned before. The first thing is, that they be all *English*. For *England* had always Men enow for a *French* Voyage: and it would be very displeasing to have Foreigners put upon us, as if our Nation were either despised or distrusted. *England* also will afford good Officers, if Care be taken to have the best: but if all the Care be to have the worst, I confess they will be very ordinary. and so it would be with the bravest Nation upon Earth. But all this while it is not intended, that the poor *French* Protestants should be excluded from joyning with us. They have been driven from their Country, by the Jesuitical bigotted Rage of their inhumane Tyrant; who hath exceeded all the Barbarities of the Heathen Persecutors. And the restoring of these poor People, next to our own Preservation, is the great End we aim at. So that there is no Doubt, but that we should gladly receive them amongst us, under their own Officers. The second thing to be observed, to facilitate the raising of the Men, is this: that there be a good Fund for their Payment, and appropriated to it; and that their Money, to prevent all Feare of Disappointments, be managed by such hands as they like. A Committee of Lords and Commons, some think, would be the most acceptable. And if his Majesty would be graciously pleased (in this extraordinary Occasion) to give leave to the same Committee to recommend the Officers, it would be very much for his Service. These are the two things, which being duly observed, there will enow good Men (both Officers and Soldiers) come in chearfully to this Expedition. And so I have done with one Branch of the Expedient, which is the raising of Men.

I now come to the other Branch, which is the raising of Money. And I am still of opinion (for my opinion hath been made known already) that an Excise upon a great many Commodities of general Use, is without comparison the best way of raising it. Two pence a pair upon Shoos, would raise a hundred thousand pounds yearly. and it might be four pence or six pence. If this seem hard to the Poor, they may wear Cloggs, or Shoos with wooden Soles, which are supposed Duty-free. And this may save a great deal of Sole-leather: which is as good as Plate, and might be exported to the great Advantage of the Kingdom. But if they think scorn to wear this sort of Shoos, they must pay the Duty of the other. The Duty, I confess, will lie a little hard upon the Shoemakers: as all Taxes lie harder upon some than upon others. But to make them some amends, and likewise to raise more Money, a high Duty might be laid upon all unwrought Leather exported. It is a great doubt, whether the Exportation of Leather be convenient or not. Some think that it ought to be wholly prohibited, as it was by the old Laws; upon the same Reasons with that of Wooll. and some think it should be freely permitted, as by our new Laws it is. But the middle way is certainly the best; that is, to permit it under a high Duty. And surely if all our Prohibitions were turn'd into Duties, it would be a happy thing. I name no other Commodities, fit for an Excise. though there be many such, that are obious to any Mans Thoughts. and a few of them would raise a greater Sum, than is required for this Service.

But if nothing else will do the Business, a Land Tax will.

will. And we need not question, but that, to carry on a Descent into *France*, the Parliament will chearfully grant it, and the People will chearfully pay it. Such a Tax as we pay this year, being granted forthwith for the year following, will give a present Credit for more than is needful for this Affair. And to bring the Tax to some Equality, and to ease a great many People; No Man to pay above two Shillings in the pound. The Abatements to be allowed by Commissioners in the Counties, upon good Proofs made before them; and to be confirm'd by a Committee of Lord and Commons, the Proofs being to them transmitted in writing. By which means the whole Amount of the Tax will be about a Million. The Pay of the twenty thousand Men for a whole year, reckoning also two thousand of them to be Horse, will take up little more then half this Money: and the residue will defray all other Charges and spare.

Thus I have laid open my whole Project. Which if it be pursued, I make no doubt but it will bring great Advantages to *England*, or at least great Terror and Confusion to the *French*. For tho we should fail in our main Design, though we should not be able to seize any Ports, or having done it should not be able to defend them; yet the very attempting these things in several places, (in one place to day, and a hundred Miles off the day following,) would harass our Enemies to that degree, that they would never be able to stand under it. We may remember, that in the beginning of the late Confederate War, the *Dutch* sent out a great Fleet, with some thousands of Landmen on board it, under *De Ruyter* and

and *Van Trompe*. These past through the *English* Channel together: but with such haste, as if they had been running the Gantlope. They never so much as once stood over to the *French* Coast, or hardly look'd upon it, thereby to amuse and alarm the Enemy. When they were come to the Channels Mouth, the Fleet divided. *De Ruiter* with the greatest part sailed away to the *West Indies*, where he did nothing: *Trompe* with the rest falling down to the River of *Nantes*. near which he seized a small Island, separated by a narrow Channel from the Main. And here he lay quiet and still for about two Months: not offering to do any thing at Land; nor moving with his Fleet, as he might and should have done, sometimes towards *Bourdeaux* and *Bayonne*, and sometimes towards the South Coast of *Bretagne*. As if he made it his business to give the *French* as little disturbance as he could. But however, disturbed they were at a strange rate. All that part of *France* was in Arms, under four or five Country Dukes, with as much distraction as can be imagined. And by the continual Marching to and fro of so many thousands (for they were in mighty Numbers,) Provisions for Horse and Man upon all that Sea Coast were almost wholly consumed and devoured. In which condition they were like to continue all Summer; when on the sudden, (and for some cunning Reasons I am yet to learn,) *Trompe* takes his Men on board, and sets sail for *Cales*. and from thence round to *Catalonia*. where he landed his Men again, who were now reduced to twelve hundred, to joyn the *Spanish* Army. And the *Spaniards* wonder'd, when they beheld such a contemptible Party,

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that those should be the Men that had made so great a Noise in the World, and had so alarm'd and turmoyl'd the Kingdom of *France*. But by this we may see, what might reasonably be expected, from a vigorous and powerful Descent. Moreover we may know by our selves, how these things would work with *France*. What a condition had *England* been in last year, if *Tourville* (being Master at Sea) had had Land Forces on board him, and had used them to his most advantage; while so many Ports, and so many Countries on that Coast lay open to him? And if he had master'd and fortified any of our Ports, what *Thorns* had they been in our sides? Also we may remember, how easily he landed at *Torbay*.

Having seen what Good may come, by pursuing this Project of a Descent upon *France*; let us now consider what Evils may come, in case it be not pursued. And truly unless something of this nature be done, there is reason to fear we shall be hard put to it. The posture of our Affairs will not be very good at Sea, and will be very bad at Land. At Sea we shall in likelihood be Masters for the present: but if we have no Land Forces on board, we shall make no Use considerable of that great Advantage. For the *French* will not come out; and We shall ly still and do nothing, at least not to any great purpose. 'Tis true, we may land our Seamen upon the Coast; and make some little havock, by burning or otherwise. but what will this signify? And when our Ships are foul; and our Men sickly; the *French* may have Opportunities to revenge our foul War, in greater measure. Our Shores being bolder, and our Countries lying more open,

open, and the things expos'd being more valuable. But at Land there seems to be less ground of Hope: at least there appear extreme difficulties and dangers. In the late War of the Confederates against these *French*, we know with what vigour they press upon them, year after year, and could never do any good. And the Frontier of *Flanders* is so fortified, and that of *Germany* so wasted; the *French* also have now so great a Force in the Field, and they manage their Affairs with so much Skill and Conduct; that it will be very hard to make any great Impression upon them, admitting our Forces to be something superiour. And as for *Piemont*, it will be happy if we can keep what is left. But why may not the Confederates, notwithstanding all these things, march straight into *France*: which they have been so highly blamed, for not doing two years ago? I answer, Because our Circumstances are much alter'd since that time. Our Marching Forces were then treble to the *French*: whereas now they are little more (if any more) than equal. So that what had then been safe and easy, and almost impossible to miscarry; may now prove a desperate Undertaking.

Since therefore the Confederates then would not, and now cannot, find the way into *France* by Land, We must do it by Sea. For into *France* we must get: or else this War will never have a good End; which is, the pulling down the *French* King. If *France* still continue entire and untouch'd; at the best we can hope for, he will hold us play, till he hath wearied us quite out, as it happen'd in the former War of the Confederates.

It is not probable that we should ever enter *France* by the way of *Flanders*, except our Kings Presence alter the Method of that War. For the usual Method is this. The *French*, if they are like to be hard match'd, make a shift however to encamp (little or much) within

within the *Spanish* Quarters: and then the Confederates encamp by them, to observe them. as if they were chained to the *French*, or were drawn to them by some Magnetick Force. Whereas it is the Part of a skilful General, *Trahere Hostem, non trahi*: not to dance after the Enemy, but to make the Enemy dance after Him. Which was said by that great Soldier, King *Henry IV.* (our Kings great Grandfather), in an Advice he sent to the *States of Holland*; as we find it set down by *Grotius*, in his most excellent History of the *Belgick* Wars.

[The doing the contrary last year, seems a Mistake in the high-born Duke of *Batavia*: who spent too much time in following the *Dauphin*, thereby putting his own Army to miserable Hardships. Since he could not conveniently go round by *Meniz*, he might have passed the *Rhine* at *Manheim*; which would have drawn back the *Dauphin* most effectually. And though the Duke could have gone no further, yet *Manheim* had been worth his Pains and Care. For had it been well fortified on both sides the River, it would have been as good as *Meniz*. It would have commanded far and wide into the *French* Quarters, and given maintenance to several Thousands of Men: which should be a principal Aim of the *Germans*, since they abound with Men, but not with Means to maintain them. But the fortifying of Places is not to be done without Labour: which the *Germans* will not undergo. though that be the true way to work the *French* out of their Conquests.]

But to leave this Digression; some think that our King, with his *Flanders* Army, might march into *France* by the way of *Calice*, and so along the Sea Coast of *Picardie* and *Normandie*, having the Sea open to supply him. And so he might do, if his Army were clearly Master of the Field, so that the Enemy durst not abide within distance. But for him to engage so deep in *France*, and be closely waited on by a *French* Army neer as good as his own; would be a thing extremely dangerous. and the having the Sea open would not cure the matter, nor prevent many Discommodities and Distresses that might befall him even to his ruine. Such an Invasion therefore is by no means advisable, in the high Condition the *French* are now in. But when by our Descents (in which there will be no such Hazards) they are distracted, and confounded, and every where weakened; the Confederate Armies may then from all Parts safely bear in upon *France*, and in all Probability come to a good Market. And then may the poor *French* Protestants, together with that whole Nation, expect deliverance from the horrid Oppressions they ly under: and the rest of *Europe* be freed from their Apprehensions of Slavery and Destruction.